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All wars give rise to myths and the First World War is certainly no exception.  In most 
Anglophone countries, people “know” that the war was caused by an aggressive and 
expansionist Germany.  Yet, much of the evidence suggests a much more nuanced picture.2  
Likewise, it is commonplace wisdom that the conflict was almost universally welcomed by 
the common people everywhere with this support only weakening, if at all, at the very end 
of the fighting. Even a century later, many find evidence contrary to these ingrained beliefs 
hard to accept.3 One radical argues that even right from the start, “the popularity of the war 
was not as widespread or deeply ingrained in the mass of ordinary people [as one might 
think.]”4  In the week before the shooting started, hundreds of thousands demonstrated for 
peace in Germany.5  Many of Europe’s leaders, like Kaiser Wilhelm II, thought that going 
to war would fan the flames of socialism.6  At the other end of the social pyramid, Berlin 
metalworker Richard Müller saw no nationalist euphoria among workers and his view 
seems vindicated by recent research.7 
Despite the protests, there were also significant pro-war feelings at various times 
and among diverse populations; one would do well to remember that much of this was 
orchestrated by ruling pro-war institutions.  Of course, some people caught war fever, but 
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as an eminent British historian observed the “myth that European men leapt at the 
opportunity to defeat a hated enemy has been comprehensively dispelled.  In most places 
and for most people, the news of mobilization came as a profound shock, a ‘pearl of 
thunder out of a cloudless sky.’”8 Mass disbelief was followed by fear, confusion and 
fatigue certainly, but also by resentment and even fury.   
 Before discussing the war itself, a brief analysis of why it broke is in order.  First, 
certain possibilities can be eliminated.  It was not merely about an assassination as Europe 
had sadly seen a number of important people murdered without a war ensuing.  The war 
wasn’t about race as it was fought mainly by Europeans and colonial people dragged into 
the fight by their European overlords.  It was not about religion as French Catholic killed 
German Catholic, German Protestant slaughtered English Protestant, Arab Muslim attacked 
Turkish Muslim and Jews fought for their nation regardless of its predominant creed.  
Many other circumstances worked in tandem to spark the war. One enabling factor was that 
the European rulers had to a large extent forgotten how destructive war could be.  With the 
notable exceptions of the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-
1871), the European powers had either been at peace or only fought ill-equipped “natives” 
in colonial wars since the Napoleonic War ended at Waterloo in 1815.   
What had changed in the century since Napoleon’s defeat was the industrialization 
of much of Europe with resulting economic competition.  Even the American President, 
Woodrow Wilson commented, “…is there any man or any woman—let me say any child, 
who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial 
rivalry?”9 Nor did this competition take place solely within national boundaries.  By the 
early twentieth century, there were numerous industrial or financial organizations that 
destabilized the international political arena.  For these companies, there was no limit to 
their accumulation of capital since, “the ‘natural frontiers’ of Standard Oil, the Deutsche 
Bank or DeBeers Diamond Corporation were at the ends of the universe, or rather at the 
limits of their capacity to expand.” 10 
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Economic warfare had led to Imperialism and the search for colonies across the 
planet.  Approximately a quarter of the earth's land fell to the onslaught of a handful of 
dominant nations while the formerly independent inhabitants were reduced to the status of 
colonial subjects with few rights.  With the world divided up, the only way to gain more 
territory was through war.  Great Britain planned on a transition from coal to oil-fired ships 
and looked greedily at the rich oil fields belonging to Germany’s ally, the Ottoman 
Empire.11  The ever-growing importance of oil led Britain’s foreign secretary to contend 
after the war, the “Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil.”12 It may be more than 
coincidence that World War I was between one side that represented the vast majority of 
colonial empire owners versus Germany and her allies who were devoid of overseas 
holdings.13  None other than Lloyd George, Great Britain’s war leader, admitted that it was 
an imperialist war.14  
 Once the shooting had begun, both sides initially thought that the war would be over 
if not by Christmas, certainly by the spring.  Naturally, most on both sides assumed their 
own side would win.  Reality soon intervened.  The war was neither to be short in duration 
nor heroic fun like so many military recruiters promised.  Because the opposing armies 
bogged down into trench warfare after the initial German offensive was stopped outside of 
Paris, the fighting took on an almost otherworldly quality.  Living for long periods in 
trenches, shared with lice, filth, mud and often their dead comrades, soldiers found the 
misery of everyday life almost as painful as actually fighting.   During these lulls, the 
fighting continued to a certain extent with shooting at the enemy trenches.  Given the 
closeness of the trenches and the lack of real hatred among many soldiers, it appears that 
direct “communication of friendly sentiments was not uncommon.”15  This often led to 
what have been called “Live and let Live” agreements where the uniformed warriors simply 
refused to provoke firefights.  One scholar observed that, “on many occasions tacit 
agreements existed between the opposing troops to restrict offensive activity.”16 
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 During the first Christmas of the war, a strange, one is tempted to say surreal, series 
of events took place at places all along the trenches.  After months of attempting to murder 
and maim each other, soldiers decided that there should be a Christmas truce.  Not only was 
the fighting suspended for a time but enemies wandered tentatively into “no man’s land” to 
exchange greetings, gifts and even play sports together.  Hushed up at the time and 
downplayed since, the truce actually took place.  Although once called a “latrine rumour,” 
“eyewash” and far less polite things, it is now accepted that it not only took place but was 
far more extensive than once believed.17  In 2005, a $22,000,000 budget European movie 
was made called Joyeux Noel that dramatized the truce.  By 2014, a United States military 
collectors company issued a catalog offering “World War I Christmas Truce Figures” for 
sale.18  At the time, the warlords appear not to have taken such a kindly view towards their 
subordinates’ expressions of human solidarity.  On 29 December 1914, the German high 
command forbid all fraternization and made approaches to the enemy punishable as high 
treason. All the same, there was still some, limited fraternization during Christmastime of 
1915.19 
 Nor was fraternization limited to the Western front. Often overshadowed by the 
later, greater drama of the 1917 Revolutions are earlier incidents of Russians 
communicating with German or Austro-Hungarian soldiers. “We send them sausage, white 
bread and cognac,” one 1915 letter to home reads, “the Germans give us cigarettes.”20  It is, 
of course, tempting to see all such incidents as isolated and insignificant kinks in the 
otherwise well-functioning military machines possessed by all sides.  Still for the pro-war 
rulers, these were dangerous seeds that might take root and lead to mutiny as, in fact, 
happened in Russia, Austro-Hungary, France, Germany and even Great Britain.21  There 
were indications that many combatants were far less bloodthirsty than their rulers at home. 
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 After the war, groups of former officers and some ultra-nationalist veterans 
attempted to make a great deal of noise about the nobility of sacrifice and comradeship of 
the trenches.  One historian warns that it “would be hopelessly misleading to regard the 
testimony of literate, educated, upper-and middle-class combatants as descriptive of the war 
experience as a whole.”22  Some soldiers, particularly socialists, saw the war as merely a 
harsher version of pre-war bourgeois society. Many argued that the war was the logical 
extension of proletarianization in civilian life; humans in both cases being reduced to 
handmaidens of machines.   
 Authors often quibble about the exact quantity of suffering on the battlefields of 
Europe, yet all the differing figures still point to an almost inconceivable number of dead, 
maimed, and missing.  Just look at these numbers: 
 
    Mobilized  Dead   Wounded 
 
Germany                    11,000,000                   1,773,700                     4,216,058    
Russia                        12,000,000                   1,700,000                     4,950,000 
France                          8,410,000                   1,375,800                     4,266,000 
Austria-Hungary          7,800,000                    1,200,000                      3,620,000 
United Kingdom          8,904,467                      908,371                      2,090,212 
Italy                              5,615,000                      650,000                        947,000 
Rumania                       750,000                      335,706                        120,000 
Ottoman Empire           2,850,000                      325,000                        400,00023 
 
What these numbers fail to show, however, is that suffering extended beyond just those 
soldiers killed and wounded.  That is, the qualitative horrors of trench warfare.  The terrible 
emotional and psychological impact of industrialized warfare resulted in scars less obvious, 
but no less real, than those caused by bayonets.  Simply put, some solders lost a leg or an 
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arm while others forfeited their joy of life, their nerves or even their minds completely.  
Angst, anxiety, worry became a long term or even permanent condition for millions.24 
 Even early in the conflict, there were a large number of officers who appear to have 
been killed by their own men.  The military high command didn’t broadcast this fact nor, 
for rather obvious reasons, did the soldiers who shot them.  This seems to have mainly 
occurred to particularly cruel officers who treated their men with hostility and disdain.  But, 
it also happened to sadistic leaders who mistreated the “enemy.” German soldier Julius 
Koettgen reported instances early in the war in which officers ordered that defeated French 
be killed rather than made prisoners. Koettgen, wrote, “not all the soldiers approved of that 
senseless, that criminal murdering.  Some of the ‘gentlemen’ who had ordered us to 
massacre our French comrades were killed ‘by mistake’ in the darkness of the night, by 
their own people, of course.  Such ‘mistakes’ repeat themselves almost daily . . .”25 In his 
memoirs, William Hermanns who was a German veteran of the Western Front, reported on 
the hatred felt towards many officers. While marching to Verdun, “. . . [He] first heard the 
whispered slogan ‘A bullet from the rear is just as good as a bullet from the front.’”26It 
worth noting that German soldiers were killing officers long before defeat loomed. 
 The war took an almost unbelievable emotional and psychological toll on the people 
at the front.  Little wonder that one author concluded one, “should not rule out the 
possibility that almost half of the survivors sustained more or less serious psychological 
disturbance.”27  This is famously on display in the war art of German veteran Otto Dix.28  
Jay Winter argues that “Dix represents every possible manifestation of dehumanization:  
madness, mutilation, horrific wounds, putrescent corpses, rapes, civilian casualties, sexual 
depravity, wretchedness.”29 
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 Nor was the pain limited solely to those in uniform.  Besides the obvious suffering 
caused by artillery shelling and the like, the stationing of German, British and other, 
soldiers outside their home country inevitably led to various crimes, both petty and major, 
against the occupied civilian population.30 Even those civilians left unmolested saw their 
lives turned upside down, as witnessed by women who were thrown into dangerous factory 
war work.31 Many female armaments workers were poisoned by TNT or other materials 
they had to handle.32 For Germany and her allies, the war meant civilians would be starved, 
frequently to death, by the British naval blockade of formerly food importing nations. 33  If 
German industrial growth had threatened England’s claim to economic supremacy, it 
handed the Royal Navy a potential hostage, “in the form of a German urban working 
class.”34 The resulting illness and death may have even been decisive in the outcome of the 
war.35 
 Most scholars agree that given such international carnage support for the war was 
tenuous; this went from bad to worse the longer the war dragged on. An Englishwoman 
married to a German Prince, spent the war in Berlin and recorded her impressions in a 
diary.  While such sources are always highly personalized and thus somewhat suspect, they 
can be useful for understanding the range of emotional responses to World War I and the 
general outlook of the populations.  As early as autumn 1914, Princess Eveyln Blücher 
records many events that unset her privileged social circle.  She reports of German soldiers, 
after being hit by sniper fire, being ordered to shoot into crowds of fleeing Belgian civilians 
so “many innocent perished with the guilty.”  The much-respected Imperial German army 
also comes in for criticism as the Princess learns from a wounded German officer how “his 
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regiment had been practically annihilated by their own side, through a mistake of his 
Colonel’s.”36  By late 1915, the Princess expresses the fear of many of the elite that, 
“Germany will be a very difficult country to live in after the war, as, whether she wins or 
loses, the Socialists are going to revolt- I feel quite sure of that.”37 
  What led to such dire reactions on the part of presumably patriotic citizens in 
uniform?  One vital factor was that the class conflict of industrial life was reproduced in the 
officer/enlisted men split in the trenches.  The actions of officers reinforced, over and over 
again, the difference between the privileged and the proletarians.  “What about the way the 
officers live, when not in action?  Pheasant served on slices of pineapple, with champagne, 
is a mere item in a long menu,” wrote Princess Eveyln Blücher in 1915, “whilst others are 
starving.  The bread they get is so hard that they cannot bite it, and often there is not even 
that.  The injustice of all this is bound to make them cry out for equality and fairness, not 
that they should be sent out to fight other men, called enemies, who are just in the same 
plight as themselves.”38  It was no different in the French army, where officers commonly 
thought the men would work better if you gave them hardly “anything to eat.” At the same 
time, their officers drank, filled their bellies and were warm.   In protest, French enlisted 
men attempted to report themselves sick only to be refused by the medical officer.  As they 
bitterly retreated from the officers, they began to sing the “Internationale,” the socialist 
hymn.39 
 In the months to come many ordinary Europeans would certainly defy the age-old 
stereotype of being docile and unthinking.   Little wonder when one considers the suffering 
that almost all sectors beyond the rulers had endured since the outbreak of war.  Russia may 
stand out as the example where mutiny led to victorious revolutions but it was only the 
weakest link in the European chain.  Central Europeans were hardly much better off.  
Added to the losses on the battlefield, the home front was, by 1916, “defined by food 
shortage.” As early as March, a letter from Hamburg tells how queues of 600, 700 or 800 
people formed outside shops whenever butter was delivered.40  While all urban areas in 
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central Europe suffered, Vienna probably was hardest hit.  By 1917, a quarter of million 
people stood daily in one of 800 food lines spread throughout the city.41 In Berlin, even the 
privileged could complain that everyone was, “all growing thinner every day, and the 
rounded contours of the German nation have become a legend of the past.  We are all gaunt 
and bony now, and have dark shadows round our eyes, and our thoughts are chiefly taken 
up with wondering what our next meal will be . . .”42  By the end, 760,000 German civilians 
died because of the food shortages caused by the British blockade.43 
 Friedrich Adler, a radical anti-war socialist, publicly shot a high Austro-Hungarian 
official in October 1916.  At his trial Adler damningly indicted the rulers for waging war 
without the people’s consent.  Although sentenced to death, Adler’s sentence was 
commuted to eighteen years because of the wide support the assassin enjoyed among the 
working class and even beyond.44 While this act was exceptional, the feelings that 
motivated it were not.  It can be argued that the First World War, even allowing for the new 
industrial technology, was no more brutal or murderous than any number of previous wars.  
What may have been more unique was the level of collective anti-war opposition to it.45  
 Be that as it may by 1916, perhaps 1917 at the latest, Europeans in war locked 
nations were tired of the conflict.  The populace was tired and more than a little angry at 
those they believed had begun the conflict as well as those who were seen as profiting from 
it.  Certainly, there were some who still bought into the romantic myths of the extreme 
right, for example Adolf Hitler, who at this point was an insignificant corporal in the war.  
Yet, one wonders if these supporters were as common as was later claimed.  What is not in 
dispute is that the war gave birth to anti-war agitation throughout the continent of Europe.  
In turn, these peace movements evolved towards revolution as millions came to believe that 
their rulers wouldn’t end the war.  In the face of such belief, the response was that they 
must dispose of the rulers themselves. 
 If the war to end all wars was a disaster for the commoners of the West, it was, if 
possible, even worse for the people of the Russian Empire.  Backward economically and 
                                                          
41
 Watson: 332. 
42
 Blücher: 158. 
43
 Vincent: 170. 
44
 Watson: 373-374. 
45
 John Mueller, “Changing Attitudes towards War: The Impact of the First World War,” British Journal of 
Political Science, 21(1), January, 1991:11. 
424 
 
deeply superstitious, as much as religious, Russia was a historical curiosity.   French 
financial capital had invested heavily in attempts to modernization this land as had the 
British and even Americans.  Between 1890 and 1904, the total railroad mileage of Russia 
doubled.  In addition, the national production of coal, iron, and steel doubled during the last 
five years of the nineteenth century.  So, the Russian bourgeoisie with all its ties to Paris 
and London was European in mind set.  Likewise, the radical leaders were far better 
schooled in revolutionary theory than one might expect.  This might in small way because 
Czarist censors allowed Marx’s Capital to circulate freely since they thought “few will read 
it and even fewer will understand it.”46 
On 8 March 191747a demonstration was held in Petrograd for International 
Women’s Day.  Some striking men joined the demonstration whose size amazed both 
organizers and bystanders.  When on Monday, troops were told to shoot down civilians, 
they began to shoot their officers instead.  Officers fled for their lives while many, maybe 
half, soldiers joined the protesters. To try to control the unrest Nicholas II, Czar by Grace 
of God, headed from the front back towards rebellious Petrograd.  On Wednesday, the 
Czar’s train was halted by mutinous troops and he was forced to flee to a military base 
southwest of the capital only to find that there was no army present to support him.  After a 
period of confused bewilderment, Nicholas II abdicated.  When his brother refused the 
throne, the Romanov dynasty came to an end.  A Provisional Government was set up by 
members of the previously tame parliament, the Duma.  It immediately faced a competitor 
in a popular assembly known as the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies 
that consisted of 2,500 delegates elected from work places and army units.48Worse was the 
fact that the new Provisional Government, faced with almost unbearable pressure and more 
than a few threats from their Western allies, felt compelled to stay in the war.   
Early enthusiasm for the new government soon vanished as the continued butchery 
of the front combined with ever worse shortages on the home front to alienate the bulk of 
the population.  Not only was everyone hungry, at the front food shortages combined with a 
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scandalous lack of armaments for soldiers. One historian later commented, “Short of food, 
and short of clothes, the Russian soldier with any guts left to fight in 1917 often found 
himself without weapons to fight with.  One-third of the number of rifles required at the 
front were lacking in 1917.  In order to obtain rifles, those who had no weapons waited for 
their fellows to die, desert, or get wounded.”49 Things were hardly better on the economic 
front.  The want of manufactured goods was severe with basics, “like kerosene, soap, 
textiles, paper, leather and metal products” in short supply.  “By October the cumulative 
effect of these shortages was taking its toll of human patience.”50 
Bolsheviks who had flirted with support for the Provisional Government were 
knocked back into line by leader V.I. Lenin who returned from exile in April. Despite 
endless rumors to the contrary, there is “no evidence of any secret agreement between 
Lenin and the Germans.”51 For all the various anarchists groups, “the great hopes stirred up 
by the February Revolution soon turned into bitter disappointment.”  In fact, they were 
soon to join the Bolsheviks in promoting a second revolution.52 
When one reads of the situation in Russia in those days, it is not surprising that the 
Provisional Government was overthrown.  In a sense, it is a sign of the patience of the 
Russian people that no one did so sooner.  Leaving aside other mistakes that were made, it 
seems as if the lack of supplies would have brought down even a strong government.53  The 
formation led by liberal lawyer Alexander Kerensky was many things but it could not be 
accused of being strong.  It failed to deal with the two basic problems undermining Russian 
society, the war and economy chaos.  This resulted in further radicalizing workers and 
within a period of a few months “compelled the workers . . . to give their support to a new 
leadership—that of the Bolsheviks.”54 Throughout 1917, this party’s influence grew as 
more moderate revolutionary groups lost influence, particularly among the workers of 
Petrograd.55 
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Revolutions also serve to embolden those, like many German workers, already 
predisposed to rebellion.56Not that other Europeans involved in the bloodbath of the 
trenches or the sufferings at home needed external examples to tell them things were bad.  
In Austria-Hungary, the slashing by half of the flour ration led to strikes around Vienna on 
14 January 1918.  Spreading throughout the Hapsburg Empire, around 700,000 workers of 
various ethnic backgrounds took part as the strike lasted ten days.  Early the next month, 
there was a naval mutiny that lasted for three days where sailors had flown the red flag, 
demanded a peace without annexations and killed an officer.57 On 28 January 1918, Berlin, 
the German capital to the north, saw the region’s entire armament industry come to a halt as 
hundreds of thousands of workers organized by the Revolutionary Shop Stewards 
demanding peace without annexations as well as more radical demands like the 
democratization of the entire state structure.58Nor could this strike be dismissed as merely a 
knee jerk reaction to food shortages as earlier work stoppages were.59  
Within the Imperial German Navy, disaffection with conditions and treatment had 
led to riots in August 1917, discipline being restored only very brutally with sailors 
receiving heavy sentences and over a dozen actually executed.60 Nonetheless, the 
suppression was to prove a grave mistake for the Admiralty, and a valuable lesson for 
German sailors.  By October 1918, with peace seemingly at hand, the latter were in no 
mood to listen to their officers, be they right or wrong.  On the 28th of that month, the High 
Seas Fleet began to assemble outside Wilhelmshaven Naval Station in the North Sea. What 
the German Admiralty had in mind was an assault against the British fleet whereas what the 
sailors were thinking was not considered. A sailor recalled later: "Rumors circulated to 
the effect that it had been decided to engage the enemy in a final encounter, in which the 
German fleet would triumph or die for the glory of the 'Kaiser and the Fatherland.' The 
sailors of the Fleet had their own view on the 'Glory of the Fatherland'; when they met they 
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saluted one another with a 'Long Live Liebknecht. "'61   
Even if this perception was not universal, it is certainly indicative of the mood of 
large sections of the fleet's rank and file sailor.  Thus, when ordered to sea, the crews on the 
Thüringen and Helgoland mutinied.  In a vain effort to prevent the spread of mutinous 
sentiment, it was decided to separate the squadrons of his battle fleet and the third squadron 
was dispatched to Kiel.  As soon as these ships docked, radical activity began anew.  
Petitions were circulated demanding the release of imprisoned comrades as the thin veneer 
of discipline began to crack with officers' orders being ignored with greater and greater 
frequency.  Demands that had been voiced were put into action when, on 3 November, a 
crowd estimated at 20,000 moved on the detention barracks.  Street fighting broke out when 
the crowd encountered a line of armed sailors with orders to disperse the demonstration.  
Within minutes, eight people were killed while twenty one were wounded. 
When news of the events at Kie1 reached Berlin, the shaken government headed by 
Prince Max resolved to send a reliable but well-known Social Democrat to the port city to 
calm the revolutionary waters.  Before this could happen, a crowd mainly composed of 
sailors seized numerous buildings and set up a Sailors' and Workers ' Council.62 The 
authorities had estimated that as many as a third of sailors were radicals.63It has even been 
claimed that there was a secret revolutionary organization among the members of the North 
Seas fleet, “[under]seamen's yarns in the lower deck, in the lockers, the munitions rooms, 
crew’s nests of the fighting masts, even in the lavoratories, an underground organization 
was built up which did its share towards stopping the imperialist war, and sweeping away 
the semi feudal monarchy."64 
All along the coastal area, the working class took the events at Kiel as the signal to 
rise up.  On 6 November, a Workers' and Soldiers' Council seized control of Hamburg with 
the Hamburger Echo - reappearing as Die Rote Fahne (Red Flag).65  A hundred naval 
mutineers, under guard to a prison camp, passed through Bremen where they were freed by 
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proletarian crowds. A Workers' and Soldiers' Council was established and soon in 
command, with guards being posted to ward off any government assault.  By the end of the 
first week of November, not just Bremen and Hamburg, but Lubeck, Cuxhaven, Rensburg, 
Restock and other smaller towns were in the hands of the working class.  As the Empire 
that Otto von Bismarck had so carefully built was tottering under the blow struck from the 
north, the coup de grace was delivered by a revolutionary uprising in the kingdom of 
Bavaria.66  Over one hundred thousand people assembled in Munich on 7 November to hear 
speeches demanding the Kaiser's abdication.  After the rally broke up, revolutionary 
soldiers joined with the city garrison, and all strategic points - railroads, telephone, 
telegraph offices, army headquarters and government agencies -- were occupied.   
 By 8 November, the major urban areas of Saxony, Baden, Hesse-
Darmstadt, Wurttemberg and the Thuringen states were all in open rebellion. One by one, 
old ruling dynasties were pushed off the stage of history by the rising tide of revolution.  
All these regional revolutions awaited word from Berlin that would mean the end of the 
Kaiser's political death agony and the proclamation of the long awaited republic.  
Following the lead of Friedrich Ebert, the SPD bureaucracy gained increasing influence in 
the liberal monarchical government of Prince Max of Baden.  Right-wing Social 
Democratic leader, Ebert and his close associates not only refused to consider any radical 
alternatives, but concentrated on derailing the speeding train of revolution.67  
When Ebert later learned of countless reports of meetings and protests which 
suggested that the revolution was about to hit Berlin, he was forced to demand the Kaiser's 
immediate removal.  On the morning of 9 November 1918, thirty-nine unit commanders 
were ordered to report to Army Headquarters at Spa as to whether or not their men would 
fight for the Kaiser against the revolution. The verdict was clear: most officers reported 
their troops unwilling to risk their lives for Kaiser Wilhelm II and doubtful if they would 
fight "Bolshevism." By the morning of the 9th, the streets of the Reich's capital were filling 
with large crowds.  Increasingly, shouts of "Long live the Socialist Republic!" echoed 
through the air.  
As the day went on the size of the crowds grew. One non-socialist Reichstag deputy 
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witnessed the images of that time and recorded his perceptions in his memoirs.  Returning 
to the Reichstag from a restaurant on Potsdamer Plaza, he saw throngs of people on the 
streets in larger and larger numbers while, "red flags, revolutionary songs, and shouts for 
the Social Republic were seen and heard everywhere."  Reaching the doors of the German 
parliament, he was surprised to observe "a score of fully equipped riflemen and above them 
a huge red flag.  Sailors with cartridge belts across their shoulders and rifles in their hands 
stepped forward, ready for battle."68 The Kaiser fled into exile and a German republic was 
born.  The Kaiser went but ominously the Generals remained. Two in particular had been 
the de facto rulers of Germany since 1916: Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. 
Both were very briefly place on a list of suspected war criminals. Both were quickly 
removed from this list by people more interested in order than justice.  Ludendorff became 
an early supporter of the Nazi party and Hindenburg who, later in 1933 as President, 
appointed Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor.69A story for another time. 
Now, the current author would argue that pre-war anti-militarist education 
predisposed people to be receptive to an anti-war message.  The activity of the left helped 
define perceptions of the war, as shown by the popularity of Liebknecht for his anti-war 
stand.  The experience of fraternization with the enemy, such as during the 1914 Xmas 
truce, caused a conflict within the minds of German soldiers who once again saw the other 
side, not as alien enemies but as fellow humans like themselves. Women workers 
experienced the war at home, both as workers and as those bearing the brunt of the British 
starvation blockade and contributed to pro-peace consciousness. The impact of the 1917 
Russian Revolutions helped further radicalize German workers and soldiers.  The failure of 
the Imperial German government to even consider, let alone push for, a peace without 
annexations or indemnities helped led anti-war activists to change into revolutionaries. 
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